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Political economyEco-certifications have become an important site of power struggles in commodity sectors such as for-
estry, fisheries, aquaculture, palm oil, and soy. In each, multiple eco-certification initiatives have been
developed and resisted through interactions among non-governmental organizations, governments,
and commercial actors. This paper contributes to understanding how power is embodied in certifications
by exploring how territoriality manifests in the international struggle over defining what products are
‘sustainable’ and which producers will have access to markets that require ‘sustainable’ products.
Focusing on the wild capture fisheries sector in which the non-governmental Marine Stewardship
Council (MSC) administers the preeminent eco-certification initiative, we explore the emergence of
new fisheries eco-certification initiatives in Japan, Iceland, Alaska, Canada, and the US that insist there
is no transnational monopoly on judgments over fisheries sustainability. We argue that these new
eco-certifications attempt to defend and embed territorial social and regulatory relations of production
within the contested domain of transnational sustainability governance. The initiatives accommodate
both the territorially embedded material interests, institutions, and discursive strategies of producers
(and their state supporting agencies) and transnationally embedded governance norms for assessing
and communicating sustainability. They also counter the globally applicable institutions of the MSC in
favor of making space for state and non-state actors to contend with demands for sustainability in the
global seafood market by combining place-specific attributes with transnational governance norms.
 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
This paper examines an apparent puzzle in the trajectory of
eco-certification as an instrument of transnational sustainability
governance: the rise of new fisheries eco-certification initiatives
that are tied to political boundaries following from a period in
which the dominant eco-certification initiatives like the Marine
Stewardship Council (MSC) have been designed to be globally
applicable. Like the MSC, these new initiatives are voluntary, they
can and do apply to several species types, and tend to be imple-
mented by fishing clients that are based within one country and
fish on stocks within a single country’s Exclusive Economic Zone.
However, while the new initiatives are limited to fisheries that
operate in specific jurisdictions, they are not necessarily state
eco-certifications, nor domestic industry eco-certifications. Their
distinguishing feature is that they are explicitly linked to territorialsocial and regulatory relations of production on the one hand and
transnational relations of governance on the other. They contain
both territorial and transnational attributes.
In this context, we explore what territoriality means in transna-
tional sustainability governance initiatives and what lessons it
lends for understanding the sustainable seafood movement specif-
ically and the global economy more generally. Applying insights
from political geography and international political economy
(IPE), we explore how and why groups initiating what we are
calling territorial eco-certification bridge territorial and transna-
tional definitions and practices of sustainable production and
consumption. To do so, we have analyzed the motivations, role of
non-state and state actors and claims to credibility/legitimacy in five
emergent territorial eco-certification initiatives, all from the global
North. Our analysis reveals how new eco-certification initiatives
are at once embedded in territorial practice and highly responsive
to transnational governance norms and market conditions.
The wild capture fisheries sector offers an area ripe for research
on the global political economy of eco-certification. The sector is
widely cited as requiring better governance and proper incentives
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problems and, in particular, to correct against the tragedy of the
commons (Ward and Phillips, 2009). Within this context, the
non-profit multi-stakeholder Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)
standard-setting organization and its third-party certification,
traceability, and labeling program has become one of the most
recognized non-state market driven transnational sustainability
governance initiatives (Auld et al., 2009; Gulbrandsen, 2010).
Although robust bodies of research have advanced our understand-
ing of state responses to, and hybrid interactions with, the MSC
(e.g., Gale and Haward, 2011; Hallström and Boström, 2010;
Foley, 2012; Gulbrandsen, 2014), there is far less research on the
emergence of initiatives that are competing with, or working in
parallel to, the MSC in the capture fisheries sector. This paper will
thus contribute to research on the ‘‘market for rules” (Büthe, 2010),
or ‘‘certification wars” (Humphreys, 2006), that have become a
defining feature of eco-certification initiatives and interactions
(Eberlein et al., 2014) in various commodity sectors, including
aquaculture (Havice and Iles, 2015), coffee (Raynolds and
Wilkinson, 2007; Raynolds et al., 2007), and forestry (Meidinger,
2007, 2008; Cashore et al., 2004; Gale, 2014; Overdevest, 2010),
adding to it heretofore absent considerations of the territorial.
The following section provides theoretical context for our
concept of territorial eco-certification, linking the certification
literature to broader queries of territory in political geography
and IPE. This is followed by a review of how the rapid growth
of the MSC eco-certification initiative in the wild capture fisheries
sector triggered responses that shaped the development of
later territorial initiatives. Then we analyze five territorial
eco-certification initiatives in the fisheries sector. The initiatives
examined are located in Japan (the Marine Eco-Label – MEL),
Iceland (the Iceland Responsible Fisheries eco-label and
eco-certification program – IRF), Alaska (the Alaska Responsible
Fisheries Management Certification program), Canada (a pilot pro-
ject), and the US (an in-process proposal). Data for our analysis
were collected in two ways. First, data were gathered from a doc-
ument analysis of the MSC and each alternative eco-certification
initiatives’ official materials, meeting notes and minutes, publically
available presentations, and independent assessments of the
history and structure of the initiatives. This data collection was
targeted at identifying the motivations, role of key non-state
and state actors, and claims to legitimacy and credibility for each
initiative. Second, desk based analysis was complemented by
participant observation at a variety of industry and environmental
NGO conferences and interviews with industry participants. The
discussion and conclusion reflect on the theoretical and political
implications of our findings.
2. Conceptualizing territorial eco-certification
The rise of eco-certifications tied to particular national and
sub-national territories in fisheries offers insights into the dynamic
global politics of eco-certification, particularly the nature of
power, dominance, resistance, and alternatives there within.
Eco-certification programs like the MSC have been critiqued for
generating and being premised upon North–South relations of
imperialism similar to legal extra-territoriality of colonial empires
(Vandergeest and Unno, 2012), not least because they are driven by
northern market actors who impose foreign-generated principles
and high compliance costs onto southern producers and resource
managers (Ponte, 2012). While Southern resistance to Northern-
imposed eco-certification observed in other sectors (Vandergeest
and Unno, 2012; Hospes, 2014) does not explain the emergence
of the initiatives explored below – all of which originate in the
global North – they all are motivated by similar reactions against
pressures exerted from the global-level, including: externaldiscourses that identify local subjects in need of protective gover-
nance; narratives that depict local states as inadequate for provid-
ing governance (despite that external initiatives often depend on
existing national governance structures); and, the obfuscation of
geographically constituted, and identifiable, production and regu-
latory systems in favor of universally applicable sustainability
standards. By contrast, the new eco-certification initiatives develop
a mechanism for industry and states to demonstrate (or at least
claim) that existing, geographically bounded production practices
and regulatory institutions are environmentally sound and worthy
of international recognition. The new eco-certifications not only
espouse geographical specificity that is accessible to and valued
by producers, they also compete with and offer an alternative to
the dominant MSC by integrating transnational governance norms
within geographically organized eco-certifications. Therefore,
rather than characterize the new eco-certifications simply as an
attempt to delineate, define and control production practices in a
particular place, we use our analysis of the cases to respond to
the theoretical suggestion that understanding the emergence of
new eco-certifications tied to particular jurisdictions requires
‘‘new perspectives on state, scale and sovereignty over sustainabil-
ity in a globalized, networked society” (Hospes, 2014: 435).
To capture both the territorial and transnational dimensions of
eco-certification that we examine below, we combine insights
from political geography and critical IPE. From political geography,
we draw on critical approaches to territoriality that refute the
‘‘territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994) by exploring why and how spatial
arrangements develop and are shaped by power, iconography, and
social relations (Sack, 1986; Raffestin, 1984; Murphy, 2012). In this
vein, on one hand, territoriality can be seen as strategic: an
‘‘attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control
people, phenomena, and relationships by delimiting and asserting
control over a geographic area” (Sack, 1986: 19). It can also be seen
relationally as an ensemble of mediated relationships rooted in ties
to the material environment and other people or groups and
mediated by techniques and representations (Murphy, 2012: 162,
drawing on Raffestin). These approaches are complementary in
contexts where relational aspects of territory produce territorial
ity-as-spatial-strategy (Murphy, 2012), as in the case of fisheries
certification processes. The new eco-certifications examined below
are rooted in and generative of webs of relationships within which
territorially constituted social relations of production and trade are
‘‘dependent on the interaction between global and local (including
state-territorial) processes of political economic structuration”
(Agnew, 1994: 66–67). This approach shows how the territorial
and the global are integrated and co-constituted under specific
historical circumstances, rather than separate and always in
opposition.
Related queries in IPE on the contradictory processes of the
internationalization of the state (Cox, 1987) and associated contra-
dictions between territoriality and globality (Gill, 1992) help to
illuminate the integrated relationships between the territorial
and the global in new fisheries eco-certifications. These critical
IPE perspectives demonstrate that while production, trade and
finance are increasingly global in scope, the global political
economy is still constituted by economic entities embedded in
and constituted by spatially bounded and sovereign areas. This
reality necessitates concepts capable of contextualizing the social
forces of production and forms of state-society complexes within
an emerging market civilization world order (Cox, 1987), including
the geo-regulatory and geo-institutional differentiation of contem-
porary capitalism (Gill and Cutler, 2014; Brenner et al., 2014). This
kind of integrated approach can capture the variegated character of
market-oriented processes and regulatory frames that emerge
when governance experiments interact with inherited institutional
landscapes (Peck and Theodore, 2007; Brenner et al., 2010). These
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observed in the spread of eco-certification in the fisheries sector
as examined below.
Scholarship theorizing sovereignty beyond the traditional con-
ceptions of the geographically demarcated boundaries of the state
and highlighting political authority beyond the sovereign construc-
tion of territorial space also contends with the relationship
between territoriality and globality (Agnew, 1999, 2005; Brenner,
1999; Bulkeley, 2005). When combined with Mitchell’s (1991)
advancements in conceptualizing the state not only as a bounded,
freestanding object or actor, but as an effect of mundane processes
of authority organized around the territorial level, the state itself
can be seen as having a relative, not absolute, reliance on state
institutions and political boundaries and as being formulated
through transnational processes and relationships (see also Emel
et al., 2011). For example, territoriality can be developed and
deployed to externally undermine (Vandergeest and Unno, 2012)
or, as we argue, expand, dimensions of state authority transnation-
ally (Agnew, 2005; Brenner et al., 2014). Exploring the emergence
and features of territorial eco-certifications offers a fruitful area for
exploring not only the changing landscape of competing eco-
certification initiatives (e.g., Vandergeest et al., 2015), but also
the nature of territoriality in the global political economy more
generally.
3. Transnational sustainability governance in fisheries
3.1. The Marine Stewardship Council
Although as many as 29 organizations around the world provide
certification or similar forms of standardized recommendations for
sustainable seafood at various scales (Parkes et al., 2010), the MSC
is the dominant program in capture fisheries (Ponte, 2012). Critical
of real and perceived failures of state management of fisheries
worldwide and drawing inspiration from the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) partnered with
Unilever in 1996 to create market-based economic incentives for
producing and consuming sustainable seafood. The resulting MSC
began by developing a performance standard to measure the sus-
tainability of fisheries, formally became a not-for-profit charity
organization in the United Kingdom in 1999 and started granting
certification to applicant clients assessed by third-party certifica-
tion bodies in 2000. By the mid 2010s, the MSC had attracted hun-
dreds of fisheries to its program, authorized the use of the MSC
eco-label on thousands of products, and perhaps most importantly,
secured commitments from a wide array of major retailers in North
America and Europe to procure MSC products. The MSC, and the
wide array of certifications in fisheries and aquaculture that have
sought to compete with it, are transnational in two ways. First,
they are designed to be global, universal standards with criteria
that can be applied to any fishery around the world. Second, they
are designed to verify and communicate the sustainability of prod-
ucts and commodities that cross national borders through the use
of chain of custody mechanisms and eco-labels considered credible
by transnational governance and market actors.
The non-state and private dimensions of MSC receive significant
conceptual attention because the program is administered by an
NGO, oriented towards generating uptake among private commer-
cial actors, and places faith in changing practices through market
mechanisms. However, the MSC is intimately connected with gov-
ernments and international institutions. For example, its environ-
mental standard requires the existence of fisheries management
practices that are often initiated by governments and its regulatory
structure is aligned with various laws and principles of fisheries
management developed in the 1980s and early 1990s by the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)(Gulbrandsen, 2010; Hallström and Boström, 2010). Moreover,
the MSC’s relevance has grown because states have responded
directly to it in at least four ways. Specifically, states have (1)
contributed to developing intergovernmental guidelines on best
practices for fisheries eco-label processes upon which MSC princi-
ples are based; (2) provided technical, data and regulatory support
for domestic fisheries under assessment for MSC eco-certification;
(3) endorsed eco-certification in seafood policy strategies;
and (4) supported the development of eco-certification initiatives
that serve as alternatives – or competitors – to the MSC eco-
certification (Gulbrandsen, 2014).
In particular, Nordic states and Nordic producer interests played
a crucial role in establishing conditions that facilitated the devel-
opment of territorial eco-certifications. In the late 1990s, as
WWF and Unilever worked towards developing the MSC’s Princi-
ples and Criteria for Sustainable Fisheries, several fisheries inter-
ests within Nordic countries cooperatively mounted a response
that helped establish international institutional conditions that
facilitated the subsequent rise of the territorial initiatives exam-
ined below. Wary about the MSC, and considering themselves
too passive with respect to external market trends and under
threat from external actors (MacMullen, 1998), Nordic fishing
interests perceived the MSC ‘‘as something of a usurper: a self-
appointed judge on the performance of governmental manage-
ment regimes” (Stokke et al., 2004: 297). Taking action on behalf
of the Nordic Council group of countries—Denmark/Faeroe Islands,
Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—Norway sub-
mitted a proposal to the FAO Committee on Fisheries in July
1998 ‘‘to investigate the feasibility and practicability of developing
non-discriminatory, globally applicable technical guidelines for the
ecolabeling of fish and fish products which should take into
account inter alia the specific characteristics of each state and
region” (Cited in MacMullen, 1998: 31). The FAO responded by
convening a Technical Consultation in Rome that was attended
by 45 national delegations, representatives of three inter-
governmental organizations, and seven international NGOs,
including the WWF and the MSC. The group decided that FAO
would have no role in particular eco-certification initiatives and
instead would draft guidelines for an ‘‘over-arching framework”
and ‘‘globally applicable minimum criteria” under which specific
eco-certification and labeling initiatives could develop. The group
also decided that the criteria for any eco-labeling initiative should
be based on the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing
(FAO, 1995) and stressed that any emergent FAO guidelines should
take into account ongoing related work by organizations such as
the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Standards
Organization, the World Conservation Union, and the MSC.
In addition to sparking FAO action on eco-labels which, in time,
yielded transnational governance norms around eco-labeling,
Nordic countries also explored the idea of developing a territorial
eco-certification. The Nordic Council of Ministers established
the Nordic Technical Working Group on Fisheries Labeling Criteria
that proposed an arrangement for the voluntary eco-certification
of sustainable fishing in the North-eastern Atlantic region. The
arrangement was adopted by the Nordic Ministers of Fisheries in
August 2001 (Stokke et al., 2004: 296). Attempting to bolster a
regional definition of sustainable fisheries, in January 2004, repre-
sentatives from Nordic countries agreed to examine the possibility
of a Nordic initiative for eco-labeling while continuing their
engagement in the FAO (NORA, 2005). Plans for a Nordic
eco-label effort faltered in 2005, while the FAO’s Committee of
Fisheries released The FAO Guidelines for the Ecolabelling of Fish
and Fisheries Products from Marine Capture Fisheries (FAO, 2005) in
the same year. The FAO guidelines offered general principles
for fisheries eco-labeling initiatives, including that they should
include objective third-party fishery assessments using scientific
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consultation, offer opportunities for complaints, rules for adjudica-
tion, and have standards based on the sustainability of target spe-
cies, ecosystems, and management practices (Sainsbury, 2010).
This synopsis is important for our analysis of territorial eco-
certification because it illustrates that the emergence of the MSC
generated added attention to fisheries and sustainability proce-
dures at multiple regulatory scales. In turn, processes within and
between states came to be crucial to the authority and legitimacy
of the MSC standards as well as in the formation of challenges to it
(see e.g. Hallström and Boström, 2010). The FAO best practice
guidelines for eco-labels in fisheries emerged as an established
form of global governance over fisheries eco-certification and label-
ing (Foley, 2013: 292) that can, and arguably must for credibility
purposes, be used as a blueprint in the development of eco-
certification initiatives.3.2. Territorial eco-certification in fisheries
The rise of territorial eco-certifications coincides with MSC’s
rise in the global North and the release of FAO best practice guide-
lines on fisheries eco-labels. By the mid 2000s, the MSC and its
environmental NGO allies had successfully persuaded major Euro-
pean and US retailers and food service companies to commit to the
MSC in ‘‘green” purchasing policies (Ponte, 2012), with a wide
range of responses from industry and government whose partici-
pation remains central to the MSC process. In some situations,
industry and government have supported the MSC, in part to help
producers gain or secure market access (Foley, 2013; Gulbrandsen,
2014). In others, industry and government have pushed back
against a range of issues associated with the MSC (see below)
(Gale and Haward, 2011; Foley and Hébert, 2013; Ponte, 2012).
Industry and states have pursued territorial alternatives to the
MSC in part to reconcile these tensions.
Following the failed Nordic regional initiative and the success-
ful establishment of FAO guidelines on eco-labeling, beginning
in 2007, new territorial eco-certifications emerged in Japan,
Iceland, and Alaska and are currently under consideration in
Canada and the US (Table 1). They consist of (1) the Marine
Eco-Label (MEL) Japan program, established in 2007; (2) the Ice-
land Responsible Fisheries (IRF) eco-label and eco-certification
program, developed between 2007 and 2009; (3) the Alaska
Responsible Fisheries Management (RFM) Certification program,
created in 2010; (4) a Canadian pilot project initiated in 2011;
(5) and the US National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) certifica-
tion initiative, which NMFS has recommended moving forward
on, but has not finalized. To identify the nature of territoriality
in the premises of the initiatives, we analyze each across four
main issue areas: motivations, role of non-state actors, role of
the state and state actors, and claims to credibility and legiti-
macy. The analysis demonstrates how the programs incorporate
interests, ideas, actors, and institutions that are both territorial
and transnational.3.3. Motivations: Why demarcate around territories?
Our analysis reveals four core, and closely related motivations
that develop territoriality-as-spatial strategy: (1) to respond
strategically to the MSC, (2) to respond strategically to the
transnational sustainable seafood movement, (3) to reassert and
demonstrate territorial control over national fisheries manage-
ment authority and production, and (4) to enhance control over
information and communication of territorially-specific regulatory
and production practices, manifested as a territorialized brand of
eco-certification.3.3.1. Strategic response to MSC
Developing an alternative to the MSC was a significant motiva-
tion – and arguably the prime catalyst – for all of the case studies.
Industry and state actors identify three problems with MSC eco-
certification that contribute to the logic for creating a territorial
alternative to it. The first problem is the costs of eco-certification
for industry and the direct and indirect costs for government.
These include original third-party certification costs, eco-labeling
licensing fees along the supply chain paid directly to the MSC,
and periodic third-party audit and re-certification costs. These
costs have long been considered exclusionary for small-scale fish-
eries and developing country fisheries (Ponte, 2008); however,
they are also a matter of protest for large firms such as processors
that deal in high volumes and therefore stand to pay high
aggregate sums of eco-label licensing fees. Costs have become
more contentious as price premiums for labeled products
have remained elusive at the producer-level even when well-
established MSC retail markets capture premiums (Roheim et al.,
2011). In Japan, a major motivation for a territorial initiative was
to offer a framework in which large and small-scale fishers alike
could obtain eco-certification rapidly and at low costs (Moye,
2010). In Iceland, producers sought to avoid expensive verification
processes through its program (Bjarnason, 2007; Thórarinsson,
2010). Frustration with costs of MSC eco-certification and
eco-label licensing fees were also a major motivation in the
Alaska case (Foley and Hébert, 2013). In Canada, a territorial
system was explored because it was expected to ‘‘serve as alterna-
tives to existing eco-label certifications, such as that of the
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), which can be complex and
costly for some fisheries with otherwise responsible management
systems in place” (AAFC, 2011a).
A related problem that producers and government faced with
MSC emerges from its transnational nature. MSC has powerful
influence over market access. Retailer commitments to procuring
only MSC-certified fish has fostered the perception of monopoly
within industry circles, motivating actors to consider developing
and promoting alternatives. Monopoly in the marketplace was
cited explicitly in Iceland (Bjarnason, 2007) and Alaska (Foley
and Hébert, 2013). Furthermore, the MSC relies on existing state-
based management resources and structures, including access to
data that is collected and analyzed by fisheries management
agencies in order to assess whether a fishery complies with
MSC’s requirements for effective management. In some cases,
government and industry actors view that they are subsidizing
the MSC – and the monopoly-like dynamics that it has fostered –
which is profiting from long-standing existing regulatory and pro-
duction practices while obscuring, or appropriating, the territorial
origins of those practices.
3.3.2. Strategic responses to the sustainable seafood movement
The MSC operates in the wider context of market-oriented
initiatives to affect change in fisheries and seafood markets; such
initiatives draw on both transnational and more place-based
demand and supply-oriented strategies. Demand-oriented strate-
gies include consumer information and education cards, restau-
rants and celebrity chef programs, and efforts to engage retailers
directly to shift purchasing policies. Supply oriented initiatives
include the MSC and other eco-labels which offer a method to
demonstrate products come from a fishery, or a specific and iden-
tifiable producer, deemed sustainable (Konefal, 2012; Silver and
Hawkins, in press). Producers experience this movement through
buyer demands to verify and demonstrate that seafood products
come from responsibly managed fisheries. Producers’ options for
doing so remain limited and mainly involve undergoing third-
party assessment for MSC’s environmental standard or alternative
initiatives, though efforts to identify place-based alternatives and
Table 1
Overview of territorial eco-certification initiatives.
Name (est., type) Motivations Non-stateactors Role of the state Claims to credibility
MEL Japan (2007, public–
private corporation)
– Alternative to MSC
– National authority and
reputation
– Resist external influence
– Fishing industry
– Japan Fisheries Association
– Civic groups
– Government on Board & Council
– Public–private (‘public
interest’) corporation
– FAO
– Multi-stakeholder
– Independent certification
– National history of
co-management/cultural
practice of sustainable use
Iceland IRF (2007/2009,
non-
profit foundation)
– Alternative to MSC
– Resist external influence
– National authority and
reputation
– Control "sustainability”
market access
– Fishing industry
– Fisheries Association of
Iceland
– Ministry of Fisheries, Marine
Research Institute,
Directorate of
Fisheries
– Public–private marketing and
promotion body
– FAO
– ISO 65
– 3rd party certification
– Multi-stakeholder
– National history & success
of fisheries management
Alaska RFM (2010/2011,
public–private non-
profit
corporation)
– Alternative to MSC
– State-level authority
and reputation
– Control ‘‘sustainability”
market access
– Fishing industry, especially
processors
– Alaska Seafood Marketing
Institute
– State government
– Public–private agency adminis-
ters
program
– FAO
– ISO 65
– 3rd party certification
– Multi-stakeholder
– History of conservation
mandate in state
constitution
Canada (pilot project, 2011,
NA)
– Alternative to MSC
– National authority and
reputation
– Fishing industry
– Fisheries Council of Canada
– State support for pilot
– Financial support from
Federal Agri-food Department
– Federal management agency
assisting pilot
– FAO
– 3rd party certification
– Multi-stakeholder
– Fisheries management
frameworks & capacity
US (under negotiation 2015,
proposed federal
program
under NMFS)
– Alternative to MSC
– Resist external influence
– Control ‘‘sustainability”
market access
– National fishing industry
associations
– Public–private committee
– US National Marine Fisheries
Service
– Regional fisheries management
agencies
– US federal fisheries
legislation
– Government agency data
considered ‘neutral’
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a small scale (e.g. Campbell et al., 2014). In all of the eco-
certification cases reviewed, pressure from environmental groups
and, more importantly, from buyers looking for verification of sus-
tainability was an important factor motivating the push for territo-
rial eco-certification that could be an alternative to MSC while
offering equivalent assurances of sustainability.
3.3.3. Control over national authority and production
As demand for eco-certifications has grown, producers and reg-
ulators have expressed concern that external assessments (or the
lack thereof) could undermine not only market access, but also
government authority over fisheries management. For example, a
key objective in the Iceland IRF is to ‘‘Avoid private monopoly on
criteria” (Thórarinsson, 2010). IRF promoters stress that there is
‘‘No external private ‘guidance’ of the development of fisheries
management” (Thórarinsson, 2009: 12). One IRF leader describes
eco-certification as simply a form of ‘‘verification of government
fisheries management performance” which facilitates market
access for seafood (Thórarinsson, 2009). Alaska actors were simi-
larly motivated by concerns over intrusion by NGOs into the fish-
ery management process and industry’s perception that
standards can be changed at the discretion of NGOs and thus con-
stitute a ‘‘moving target” (Rice, n.d.). They also expressed concern
that NGOs have control over what is deemed sustainable which
in turn determines whether producers have access to markets
(Riutta, n.d.).
3.3.4. Control over territorial representation
Eco-certification provides a means for a certifier to exert control
over how state regulation and production practices are identified,
evaluated, and communicated. This motivation is related to struc-
tural issues of authority and market access as well as ideationaland discursive dimensions around territorially constituted (often
national) production and values. In Japan (MEL), a key motivation
was to create a counterpoint to widely publicized and generalized
accounts of fisheries decline. MEL was a way for fishermen to
become ‘‘activists” and publicize positive fisheries and fishing
practices and to give their account of what they see as the ‘‘real”
situation in their fisheries (Moye, 2010). The MEL eco-label was
to enable fishermen to tell their own narrative of fisheries success,
rather than to have an outsider (Western) narrative of fisheries cri-
sis being told for them through the need for an MSC eco-label (Hall,
2011). MEL also became a platform in the defense of whaling.
Though MEL is not actively undergoing an effort to certify whaling,
MEL took up this issue as a part of its national, cultural mission
(see below).
Icelandic industry actors, with government support, wished to
develop an eco-certification and eco-label to communicate to and
inform buyers about how Iceland fisheries are managed responsi-
bly (Bjarnason, 2007). Similar to the MEL case, Icelandic fisheries
interests were concerned over international environmental NGOs’
influence on tense whaling debates and whether such controver-
sies would spill over into major domestic fisheries such as cod. In
Alaska, ASMI wished to maintain Alaska stakeholder control of
messaging (Brown, n.d.) and to communicate what it perceived
to be a well-established historic reputation of sustainability of
Alaska’s fisheries (Foley and Hébert, 2013). One of the goals of
the Canadian pilot project was to provide a means to recognize
the responsible management of Canadian fisheries (AAFC, 2011b).
Likewise, a key motivation for US initiative is the argument that
federally managed fisheries in the US are already sustainable
because of the regulatory terms of and improvements made under
the national Magnuson Stevenson Act. An eco-certification
program is being explored in part as a way to verify, demonstrate
and communicate this claim (Stoll and Johnson, 2015).
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tion and communication of sustainability as a threat to govern-
ment authority and market access, but also to territorially
constituted industry identities and practices. In Japan, MEL’s web-
site invokes the Ancient history of Japanese co-management as dif-
fering from Western management practices in which culture,
regulation and management are more intertwined than in ‘‘Ameri
can–European” fisheries (Hall, 2011). Control over fisheries is a
powerful force in Icelandic culture and identity and the significant
pride within the Icelandic seafood industry provided a powerful
collective force for resisting the MSC. The Icelandic label combines
eco-certification with a logo of origin to maintain, and capitalize
on, long-standing reputation of Icelandic seafood products in key
markets (Kvalvik et al., 2014). Alaska industry and political leaders
regularly claim that long before the MSC and the FAO code of con-
duct, Alaska’s state constitution mandated that fisheries manage-
ment be conducted on the sustainable yield principle (Brown, n.
d.; Sanguinetti, 2014). In a protest against a Walmart policy to sup-
port only MSC-certified seafood, fishermen and supporters carried
posters with text such as ‘‘DON’T LET OUTSIDERS TELL US WHAT
TO EAT”, ‘‘ALASKA SALMON FOR ALASKANS” and ‘‘BUY AMERICAN?
START WITH ALASKA SALMON” (Demer, 2013). The re-making of
sustainability governance in these cases is thus motivated by a
desire to support the collective identity of territorially constituted
social relations of regulation and production.
In summary, at least four motivations played into the rise of ter-
ritorial eco-certification initiatives. These motivations illustrate
that the new initiatives are responses to an imperative for eco-
certification as a condition for market access. They are efforts to
generate alternatives to the MSC, the dominant and transnationally
legible option, that showcase sustainable practices while specifi-
cally being embedded in and highlighting territorial attributes that
organize and identify national and subnational actors as important
to their vision of sustainability.
3.4. Non-state actors, institutions, and interests
Industry leadership, often through nationally-embedded indus-
try associations in various forms of partnership with government
(see below on role of the state), has driven the development of each
territorial eco-certifications. The Japan Fisheries Association, a
public interest corporation, led the development of the MEL Japan
standard, standardizing process, and pays the salary of MEL
employees (Accenture, 2009; Moye, 2010). In Iceland, the Fisheries
Association of Iceland, which consisted of the Federation of Ice-
landic Fishing Vessel Owners, the National Association of Small
Board Owners, and the Federation of Icelandic Fish Processing
Plants, spearheaded program development. The Federation of Ice-
landic Fishing Vessel Owners, which mainly represents the owners
of large-scale industrial fishing vessels, led the process. The Alaska
RFM Certification program was led by the Alaska Seafood Market-
ing Institute (ASMI), a public–private agency created under state
law as a public corporation to serve as the state’s seafood market-
ing arm; it represents both fishing and processing interests. The
Fisheries Council of Canada led the pilot project to develop sepa-
rate eco-certification systems for capture fisheries in that country
(AAFC, 2011a); the organization is a trade association representing
about a 100 member companies engaged in the growing, harvest-
ing, processing, importing and marketing of fish and seafood in
Canada (FCC, 2011). In the US, though the proposed initiative
would be developed and run by government, much of the process
has been driven by industry with the support of government offi-
cials and elected politicians.
In promoting the development of territorial eco-certification,
industry actors are responding to components of the transnational
supply chains of which most are a part. Retailers play both indi-rect/structural and direct/instrumental role in shaping the process.
For example, retail giant Walmart emerged as a critical force in the
development of the Alaska RMF program. When the Alaska salmon
industry, led by large processors, decided to discontinue support
for MSC eco-certification and to pursue an alternative eco-
certification program, Walmart initially indicated they would have
to stop purchasing Alaska salmon because its seafood policy
required MSC or equivalent eco-certification (Foley and Hébert,
2013). After heated negotiation among Alaska industry, political
actors and the retailer, Walmart announced in 2014 that it consid-
ered the Alaska RFM program as meeting the requirements of its
sustainable seafood policy (SeafoodSource.com, 2014). In Canada,
the retailer Loblaw has communicated that the MSC is the founda-
tion of their policy and encouraged government to support the
MSC (Schmidt, 2012). In 2013, however, the Canadian pilot project
reported that the FAO-based Alaska eco-certification was gaining
credibility and market acceptance in the US and Europe and that
some retailers are looking to alternative eco-certifications due to
a lack of MSC-certified supply (AAFC, 2013). Transnational buyers
and retailers are assessing whether emerging territorial eco-
certifications meet the generalized sustainable procurement poli-
cies they have adopted and will be core to the ultimate success
or failure of the territorial initiatives.
The role of NGOs within the administrative structures of territo-
rial initiatives varies significantly and is subject to change. Leading
international environmental NGOs, such as WWF, are committed
to the MSC as the gold standard for certifying fisheries – in part
because the MSC is transnational. There is a notable lack of envi-
ronmental NGO involvement in most of the processes reviewed.
In Japan and Iceland, there has historically been distrust of envi-
ronmental NGOs in the fisheries sector resulting largely fromwhal-
ing conflicts. MEL Japan has the most diverse societal NGO
representation of the initiatives – its Board includes a wide range
of community, academic, labor and women’s groups, though no
environmental organizations – while Iceland has the least with
no environmental NGO representation. Though the Alaska program
initially did not include environmental NGOs, it has recently
moved to incorporate more diverse stakeholder representation.
Public discussions surrounding the US initiative include strong
statements against the role of third-party certifications and NGOs.
In summary, fishing and processing industry organizations that
represent producers operating within specific territories have initi-
ated the eco-certification initiatives. That their efforts intersect
with demands from important transnational commercial actors,
including buyers and retailers, illustrates how territorial eco-
certifications are intertwined with the transnational dimensions
of sustainability in seafood markets. Prominent international envi-
ronmental advocacy groups, many of which are committed to sup-
porting non-place-specific MSC, have been largely outside of the
processes; a dynamic that we hypothesize is largely a result of
these organizations, often transnational themselves, already being
aligned with the MSC or their own demand-driven sustainability
guidelines, both of which are designed to be capable of applying
to fisheries everywhere.
3.5. Role of the state
In each jurisdiction where territorial eco-certifications have
emerged, government fisheries management authorities regulate
fisheries production practices. The role of the state in territorial
eco-certification initiatives varies and is subject to change, but
the following patterns of state action were observed; states:
facilitate and/or fund the establishment, administration, and
promotion/marketing of new initiatives; provide the legal basis
for organizational forms through which initiatives are established
and administered; provide stakeholder representation on the
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tives; provide research support/technical expertise capacity; or,
in one case (the US), take full responsibility for the development
and administration of the initiative.
Each territorial eco-certification was spearheaded by industry
but with important forms of state support. MEL Japan was estab-
lished out of the work of a preparation committee that included
government officials (Nishimura, 2008). Its structure consists of a
Council, an Audit Committee, and a Board. Among the 20 positions
on MEL Japan’s Board and Council, there is one representative from
the Japan Fisheries Agency, which is a public interest corporation,
and as such, must be approved by a government ministry, pursue
activities deemed to benefit the public and be inspected by the
government every two to three years (Moye, 2010). Representa-
tives of the Fisheries Research Agency, an independent administra-
tive agency, fill two posts. Industry led the creation of the IRF in
Iceland, but the process involved continued dialog with and sup-
port from government authorities. The formal announcement of
the Iceland IRF was made in a 2007 Statement on Responsible Fish-
eries in Iceland signed by the Minister of Fisheries, a representative
of the Directorate of Fisheries (a state agency responsible of imple-
menting fisheries management legislation), the Director of the
Marine Research Institute (a government institute under the Min-
istry of Fisheries), and the Chairman of the Fisheries Association of
Iceland. In Alaska, the territorial eco-certification program was
mainly an initiative of ASMI, which was established under state
law in 1981 as a public corporation. The pilot project for a Cana-
dian eco-certification program emerged in a state venue of the
market-oriented federal Agriculture and Agri-food Canada (AAFC)’s
Value Chain Roundtables. The Seafood Value Chain Roundtable is
co-chaired by a representative from industry and a representative
from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), Canada’s fish-
eries management agency. The AAFC provided the venue for
industry-state consensus building and up to CAN$816,000 to the
pilot projects through its Canadian Industry Traceability Infrastruc-
ture Program (AAFC, 2011b).
The state also plays a role in the governance—legal, organiza-
tional, technical and administrative—functions of territorial
eco-certification initiatives. One analysis of MEL described it as gov-
ernment owned and operated (Accenture, 2009), but since it was
spearheaded and is largely administered by Japan Fisheries Agency,
which entangles the state and firms, it is more accurate to describe
it as having a hybrid structure that requires that its activities meet
the interests of both states and firms involved in the sector. In
Iceland, the IRF Foundation that administers the territorial eco-
certification program receives funding from theMinistry of Fisheries
and Agriculture’s Added Value for Seafood program and Promote
Iceland covers the salary costs for staff (Nøstvold et al., 2012: 6).
Promote Iceland, a public–private partnership established to
improve competitiveness of Iceland companies in foreign markets,
is responsible for marketing the IRF program. The program is also
described as an ‘‘integrated” program of the seafood industry and
authorities (Thórarinsson, 2011), showing the state’s active support
for creating a mechanism for promoting the sustainable attributes of
the fisheries sector. In Alaska, ASMI’s board of directors, consisting
of industry representatives appointed by Alaska’s governor, admin-
isters the eco-certification program. The state funds ASMI primarily
from state funds, federal grant monies and a tax on seafood
processors that process Alaska fish. Like in Japan and Iceland, the
Alaska case is characterized by highly integrated relations among
powerful seafood industry organizations and regulatory and
market-supporting state agencies acting in concert to support the
interests of domestic industry navigating the global industry.
The proposed US program has the most direct role of the state.
The US federal government has officially declared that it will not
participate directly or indirectly in private sector eco-certificationand has instead set out to explore a federal eco-label based entirely
on existing government management structures. State agencies see
this as an opportunity to improve relations with industry without
compromising management and conservation goals and bolster its
role as an authoritative source of information about sustainability
in fisheries (Stoll and Johnson, 2015). This effort will help industry
comply with an executive order to encourage markets for territori-
ally produced sustainable products and services that can supply
federal contracts, which often require domestically produced prod-
ucts that comply with strict rules of origin (Stoll and Johnson,
2015).
In all cases, state regulatory and marketing actors highlight and
support territorial eco-certification. By assisting industry efforts to
navigate changing global seafood markets through interventions
highlighting territorial attributes of production and existing state
regulations, the state in each case stands to actively expand its
own footprint and presence domestically and in global seafood
markets.
3.6. Claims to credibility
Each territorial eco-certification initiative is designed to provide
a new means to credibly document, verify, and communicate sus-
tainability practices. Yet the established programs are not simply
self-certification by the state and/or industry (though the US dis-
course comes closest to this approach). Instead, the dominant
trend across the cases is to build infrastructures of credibility
(Penders and Flipse, 2014) that are recognized transnationally,
but leave open the opportunity for territorial operational features.
The infrastructures of credibility in the territorial eco-certification
initiatives are largely marked by their compliance with global indi-
cators of legitimacy, including: compliance with international
norms and practices; the use of independent, science based exper-
tise; and, their formation through multi-stakeholder institutions.
To build credibility and legitimacy around the technical specifi-
cations for eco-certification, almost all cases seek compliance with,
and emphasize linkages to, transnational organizations and related
norms. All established initiatives invoke the FAO Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries (1995) and the FAO Guidelines for the
Ecolabeling of Fish and Fishery Products from Marine Capture
Fisheries (2005/2009). MEL Japan was designed to align with FAO
guidelines in an attempt to ensure legitimacy and integrity of the
overall initiative (Nishimura, 2008). In both Iceland and Alaska,
the initiatives were designed to ensure consistency with the two
FAO documents and both initiatives are promoted as FAO-based
eco-certifications. In Canada, the pilot project to test the feasibility
of an eco-certification initiative indicated plans to base the project
on FAO guidelines. At the time of writing, NMFS in the US was the
exception and did not refer to FAO guidelines in its proposed pro-
gram, instead focusing strictly on the attributes of domestic regu-
lation. In addition to the FAO, several established territorial
initiatives use and invoke the ISO 65 – the International Standards
Organization’s requirements for bodies operating under product
certification systems. The Iceland IRF claims to operate in accor-
dance with ISO Guide 65 accreditation from a National Accredita-
tion Body of the International Accreditation Forum. IRF describes
its initiative as ‘‘FAO-ISO based model” in some promotional docu-
ments. The Alaska initiative also fosters and invokes technical and
discursive linkages to the ISO and the International Accreditation
Forum. The territorial eco-certifications strategically use interna-
tional institutions to widely legitimize their practices.
Gaining transnational credibility requires the use of indepen-
dent, science-based expertise to develop and enforce eco-label
rules – a recommendation in FAO eco-labeling best practice guide-
lines. This imperative creates an important role for accredited third
party certifiers, auditors, even while the initiatives are designed
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tification model, though it has developed its own audit committee
that accredits bodies to conduct certification inspections (Moye,
2010). Iceland and Alaska have taken on a more explicit third-
party approach. The ISO-accredited Global Trust Certification Ltd.,
a firm also accredited to carry out MSC assessments, is the
approved certification body for the Iceland Responsible Fisheries
program. In Alaska, ASMI contracted the same company to estab-
lish a third-party approach to provide trade partners with indepen-
dent verification of Alaska’s fisheries management (Brown, n.d.). In
Canada, the Fisheries Council of Canada contracted Global Trust
Certification Ltd. to assist with pilot project development based
on the company’s previous work in Iceland and Alaska. The inter-
sections among ideas and practices in each case shows not only
how transnational norms come to bear on the formation of the ter-
ritorial initiatives but also how territorial initiatives contribute to
the extension and legitimation of transnational governance norms.
The outlier for reliance on third party certifiers may be the pro-
posed US initiative, which to date has explicitly resisted their use.
While the territorial eco-certifications seek to foster transna-
tional legitimacy and credibility, the internal governance of the
programs remains territorially embedded and controlled. In each
initiative, institutionalized multi-stakeholder collaboration – prin-
cipally among various seafood industry interest groups and gov-
ernment agencies – foster legitimacy and credibility, which is
further enhanced by technical guidance from scientists and experts
knowledgeable about the particular territorial production context.
In Japan, the MEL Council is unique in including a broad spectrum
of interests from the outset, including members representing Japa-
nese producers and consumers of fishery products. It oversees a
Technical Committee, which oversees the development and appli-
cation of the certification standards and the Public Relations Com-
mittee, which publicizes the system in Japan and overseas. The
Council is composed of experts and academics from various fields,
oversees basic administration matters and serves as a general advi-
sory board to MEL. In Iceland, a multi-stakeholder technical com-
mittee is responsible for the certification specifications work and
communication to the external certification body and public agen-
cies (Nøstvold et al., 2012). In Alaska, no new organization was cre-
ated to administer the RFM program. Instead, the public–private
seafood market agency ASMI administers the program and
owns the standard. It has, however, recently established a
quasi-independent RFM Conformance Criteria Committee with
international representation from science, industry, resource man-
agement, trade, and environmental NGOs. The multidisciplinary
RFM Conformance Criteria Committee acts as the ‘‘standard
custodian.”
Both territorial and transnational infrastructures of legitimacy
and credibility are deployed in the eco-certification initiatives. In
most cases, this has involved developing new institutional bodies
that operate at the territorial level and are capable of integrating
transnational norms and principles, exerting scientific expertise,
and providing the legal structures for territorial actors – primarily
the commercial sector and state agents – to collaborate in the
development of the territorial eco-certification.4. Conclusion
Identifying a moment in which industry and state actors in mul-
tiple contexts have begun to develop eco-certification initiatives
and sorting through the attributes of these initiatives, we have
identified a recent flourishing of territorial eco-certifications in
the fisheries sector. By affirming state regulatory processes and
production practices and institutionalizing and communicating a
territorial brand identity associated with responsible fisheriesmanagement, the new eco-certification initiatives seem, at first
glance, to simply territorialize a method of sustainability govern
ance—eco-certification—that the transnational MSC has used to
influence market conditions in the global seafood trade. But on clo-
ser inspection, it is clear that the territorial eco-certifications also
address distinct dimensions of transnationality that come to bear
on fisheries governance and production networks. They incorpo-
rate principles and standards of international authority (particu-
larly United Nations provisions and International Standards
Organization (ISO) standards) to make the initiatives globally leg-
ible and gain credibility and legitimacy by applying international
best practices and using certification mechanisms of chain of cus-
tody and eco-labels to verify and communicate product attributes.
In doing so, they reflect the importance of authoritative claims to
sustainability that are now deeply entrenched in transnational
governance and production networks where eco-certification is
often a requirement to access global markets.
From this set of findings, we identify the new fisheries eco-
certifications examined above as emerging forms of what might
be conceptualized as territorial sustainability governance. The terri-
torial re-making of transnational sustainability governance works
through integrated networks among territorially embedded sea-
food production interests, state regulatory and marketing institu-
tions, and international market dynamics and governance norms.
It serves to shore up the territorial, often national, industry identi-
ties and features of place-specific production and state-based reg-
ulatory regimes, and pushes these features beyond the spatial
boundaries of the state by promoting them for recognition in glo-
bal markets. It is crucial, we argue, to recognize that the outward
expansion of territorial attributes is contingent upon being embed-
ded in and navigating through, highly competitive transnational
governance and market contexts. The territorial eco-certification
initiatives are evolving within transnational commodity networks
that are demanding sustainability certification and driving indus-
try and states’ interest in developing initiatives that comply with
mounting pressures to demonstrate sustainability. The territorial
eco-certifications are, therefore, also transnational in that they
appeal to, and rely on, international authority, particularly the
FAO and ISO, to communicate transnationally legible credibility.
In doing so, the territorial eco-certification initiatives confirm
transnational meta-governance referents for global fisheries
governance.
As such, the cases do not signal a move to narrow parochialism
nor a rejection of international authority. They should not be con-
fused as state programs that assert nation-state authority from
within territorial boundaries. Reducing the initiatives to simply
the state and/or its components (e.g. fishing industry, a fishery or
bureaucratic functions of the state) or its territorial boundaries
would overlook that they explicitly embrace the transnational
opportunities and challenges associated with the global drive for
‘‘sustainable seafood”. In abiding by international norms, and
embedding them in territorial specificity, the initiatives enable
industries to simultaneously assert territorial identity and comply
with international market requirements. These features are consis-
tent with emerging notions of territoriality as a set of mediated
relationships rooted in ties to the material environment, other
groups and mediated by techniques and representations. Our case
not only shows how capital retains its links to particular states and
that states support territorially embedded capital (Lacher, 2005),
but illustrates active acts of re-embedding as a strategy that firms
and states are deploying to contend with challenges and opportu-
nities presented by the global. These findings reveal the persis-
tence of the integrated nature of capitalist production, state
forms, and world order (Cox, 1987) whereby producers and states
draw upon international governance and market norms to institu-
tionalize new forms of territoriality-as-spatial-strategy.
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highly dynamic, fluid and increasingly politicized nature of sus-
tainability governance in the global economy. As a result, the
new initiatives are pragmatic and idealistic mechanisms for con-
tending with and shaping the intersection between territorial pro-
duction and transnational economic and environmental
management. Like Bridge’s (2008: 413) explanation of the territo-
riality of oil resources as ‘‘embedded in the proprietorial, institu-
tional and cultural–political structures of the nation-state,” the
territorial eco-certification strategy carries nationalistic features
that also engage transnational dynamics. Embedded in the regula-
tory structures of the state, the eco-certification initiatives function
as a form of resistance against exclusively external, globally appli-
cable, sustainability labels. They hinge on distinguishing a pro-
ducer’s territorial brand identity in the global marketplace. These
kinds of territorial, often nationalist, sentiments around resources
can create significant shifts in the distribution of power within
and across an entire production network (Bridge, 2008; Perreault,
2006; Valdivia, 2007), not least because resources are closely
bound to notions of territoriality and identity.
In this vein, the initiatives celebrate territorial specificity,
promising an alternative to globally applicable sustainability gov-
ernance initiatives that is nevertheless both legible in the global
market and ostensibly more accessible for industry than compet-
ing global initiatives. Identifying this dynamism is not only an
exercise in understanding and showcasing change in the global
political economy of certification, it is consequential in that it con-
tinues to further complicate, if not obscure, what sustainability
certifications signify in ecological terms or otherwise. By insisting
there is no transnational monopoly on judgments over fishery sus-
tainability and by defending the value of their state investments in
regulation, these new institutions of territorial eco-certification
demonstrate how scientific claims of sustainability are still subject
to debate. They demonstrate, moreover, how territorially embed-
ded actors can exert agency in the struggle over who can legiti-
mately make sustainability claims transnationally.Acknowledgements
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